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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF LAND-WRITTEN Au-
THORITY OF AGENT.-The owner of a city lot entered into a written contract
to sell the land upon certain terms to one McConnell. The owner later sued
the defendants for damages for breach of this contract, alleging that they
were the undisclosed principals for whom McConnell was acting. The plain-
tiff was unable to show any written authority given by the defendant to
McConnell to purchase the land. Held: The provision in the Missouri Stat-
ute of Frauds that "no contract for the sale of lands made by an agent shall
be binding upon his principal unless such agent shall be authorized in writing
to make such contract" does not require that the agent of the purchaser shall
be authorized in writing. Cook v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Mo. App. 1932)
51 S. W. (2d) 134.
To reach this conclusion the Court construes the identical words in two
parts of a single sentence as having different meanings. The Statute in-
volved is the Missouri equivalent to the fourth section of the original Statute
of Frauds to which the above quoted words were added by way of amend-
ment in 1877. Mo. Laws 1877 p. 195; R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2967. As a basis
for its conclusion, the Court cites a case in which the Missouri Supreme
Court stated that the reason why the amendment was passed was because of
the innumerable suits for specific performance of contracts to sell land in
which the agent for the seller did not have written authority. Lindhorst v.
St. Louis Protestant Orphan Asylum (1910) 231 Mo. 379, 132 S. W. 666.
However, this case does not say that this was the sole reason why the amend-
ment was passed and the Supreme Court was probably only dealing with the
facts before it. In the instant case the opinion also urges that if the Legis-
lature had meant to require written authority for the agent of the purchaser
this result could have been obtained merely by adding the words "in writing"
after the words allowing the signature to be made by a duly authorized
agent. This holding overlooks the fact that the applicable section of the
Statutes deals with several other types of contracts besides contracts for the
sale of lands. Thus adding the quoted words was the easiest practical way
to impose a requirement applying solely to contracts for the sale of land.
According to the great weight of authority in states where the local statute
only requires a written contract signed by the party to be charged or his
duly authorized agent, the agent need not have been given any written au-
thority. McCullough v. Sutherland (C. C. N. D. W. Va. 1907) 153 F. 418;
Merritt v. Adams County Land Co. (1915) 29 N. D. 496, 151 N. W. 11; Le-
vine v. Whitehouse (1910) 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac. 2; Godfrey v. Central State
Bank (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 5 S. W. (2d) 529. In a few states it is held that
the agent must have written authority in spite of the silence of the statutes.
Opelousas St. Landry Bank v. Bruner (1929) 13 La. App. 337, 125 So. 507;
Miller v. New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. (La. 1844) 8 Rob. 236. These
cases apply the rule so as to require written authority for the agent of the
purchaser. Opelousas St. Landry Bank v. Bruner, supra.
It is well settled that the contract must be in writing and signed for the
seller to be able to enforce it as against the purchaser. Culligan v. Wingerter
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(1874) 57 Mo. 241. In states whose statutes require written authority for the
agent, the overwhelming weight of authority is that this applies to an agent
of the purchaser as well as to an agent of the seller. Matheron v.Ramina Corp.
(1920) 49 Cal. App. 690, 194 Pac. 86; Brown v. Vopicka (1931) 261 Ill. App.
386; Twitchell v. City of Philadelphia (1859) 33 Pa. St. 212. There are
some cases which on first reading seem opposed to the weight of authority and
to give some support to the instant case. Thus, it has been held that the
authority of the purchaser's agent to do things amounting to a waiver of
delivery of an abstract of title need not be in writing. Katz v. Dreyfoos (Mo.
App. 1930) 26 S. W. (2d) 999. Here, the contract for the sale of the land
was properly made and the waiver related to a mere incidental part. Like-
wise, an agent may bid in property for his principal at a foreclosure sale
without written authority. Mills v. Hudman & Co. (1912) 175 Ala. 448,
57 So. 739. But sales ordered by courts under public authority are governed
by different rules and do not come within the statute of frauds. Hall v.
Geising (1914) 178 Mo. App. 233, 165 S. W. 1181.
Where the offer to sell land was accepted by the attorney for the pros-
pective purchaser, it was not necessary to the validity of the contract as
against the seller that the attorney should have been authorized in writing.
Fowler v. Fowler (1903) 204 Ill. 82, 68 N. E. 414. This case, however, does
not support the view of the instant case, since there was no attempt to en-
force the contract against the purchaser and the Statute of Frauds only ap-
plies to the "party to be charged".
It would seem that in the present case the Court has ignored the true mean-
ing of the statute involved. By construing the statute narrowly and applying
it only to the agent of the seller, a door is opened through which at least some
fraud will likely enter. It would seem to involve an absurdity to protect the
seller and not give equal protection to the purchaser. H. W., '34.
TRADE SECRETs-BREAcH OF CONFIDENCE-PROTECTION OF UNPATENTABLE
DEvC.-One Booth designed a revolutionary type of automobile body, the
design of which was fundamentally based upon a use or adaptation of the
worm drive differential and the "up-kicked" frame. He patented the frame
and drive and later obtained reissue patents. He entered into negotiations
with the Stutz Motor Car Company with a view to selling the design. After
extensive correspondence, during which time the Company had the designs
in its possession, the Company refused to buy his designs and returned the
plans to him. Subsequently the Company produced a car almost identical
in design to that of Booth whereupon Booth brought an action for infringe-
ment and accounting. Held: the patents, since they embodied no patentable
advance over prior art were invalid; but one whose plans, communicated
confidentially, enter into the design of a new car is entitled to damages and
an accounting to the extent that the plans contribute to the car's success.
Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co. of America (C. C. A. 7, 1932) 56 F. (2d) 962.
The court in awarding recovery to plaintiff, though it does not specifically
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